Hayek and Organizational Studies by Foss, Nicolai J. & Klein, Peter G.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 February, 2013  
   
 HAYEK AND ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss 
Peter G. Klein 
 
SMG WP 3/2013 
978-87-91815-12-6 
 
SMG Working Paper No. 3/2013 
February, 2013 
ISBN: 978-87-91815-85-0 
 
 
978-87-91815-23-2 
978-87-91815-24-9 978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
Kilen, Kilevej 14A 
2000 Frederiksberg  
Denmark 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
  
 
HAYEK AND ORGANIZATIONAL STUDIES 
 
Nicolai J. Foss 
Department of Strategy and Management 
 Norwegian School of Economics  
and 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
 
Peter G. Klein 
Division of Applied Social Sciences 
University of Missouri 
and 
Department of Strategy and Management 
 Norwegian School of Economics  
 
Revised, February 03, 2013 
Prepared for Paul Adler, Paul du Gay, Glenn Morgan, and Mike Reed, eds.  
Oxford Handbook of Sociology, Social Theory and  
Organization Studies: Contemporary Currents.  
Oxford University Press, 2013. 
 
Abstract 
We briefly survey Hayek’s work and argue for its increasing relevance for 
organizational scholars. Hayek’s work inspired aspects of the transaction cost approach 
to the firm as well as knowledge management and knowledge-based view of the firm. 
But Hayek is usually seen within organizational scholarship as a narrow, technical 
economist. We hope to change that perception here by pointing to his work on rules, 
evolution, entrepreneurship and other aspects of his wide-ranging oeuvre with 
substantive implications for organizational theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Friedrich A. von Hayek (1899–1992) is one of the most important intellectuals and social scientists 
of the twentieth century. Over a career that spanned more than six decades Hayek moved from 
technical economics (Hayek, 1928, 1931, 1941, 1948, 1984) to the methodology of the social 
sciences (Hayek, 1942, 1952a), psychology (Hayek, 1952b), political philosophy (Hayek, 1944; 
1960; 1973), and philosophy proper (Hayek, 1964). In the diversity of his interests Hayek rivals the 
great polymath Herbert Simon, and, like Simon, holds a Nobel Prize in economics. Again like 
Simon, Hayek’s wide-ranging scholarly interests and achievements were organized around few core 
insights, the most important of which is the role of evolved rules and institutions in coordinating 
dispersed and largely tacit knowledge. Both were highly critical of the foundations of the dominant 
paradigm in economics, so-called “neoclassical” or “mainstream” economics, and in some ways 
their critiques are converging, particularly regarding the unrealistic and untenable assumptions that 
are made about the cognitive powers of decision-makers in this paradigm.  
 However, while Simon’s influence on organizational studies is undeniably vast, Hayek is less 
well known within organizational scholarship. Simon’s career began with organizational studies and 
featured a continual interest in organizations. Hayek, in contrast, had little interest in organizations 
per se and typically addressed organized activities, such as those of state bureaucracies or full-scale 
socialism, with considerable skepticism. However, one Hayek paper has been frequently cited in 
organizational studies (broadly conceived) is his 1945 essay, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” 
This paper emerged in context of the “socialist calculation debate” of the 1920s and 1930s, in which 
academic economists argued about the viability and efficiency of planned resource allocation under 
state control (Lavoie, 1985; Rothbard, 1991; Salerno, 1993). Hayek (1945) famously argued that an 
economy-wide central planner, no matter how well-intentioned, is constrained by the fact that the 
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knowledge necessary for efficient resource allocation is dispersed, subjectively held, fleeting, and 
largely tacit. Top-down planning runs up against the “knowledge problem,” which makes 
comprehensive, overall management of a complex, dynamic economy inherently infeasible. A 
decentralized market system works because market processes generate prices that embody such 
information and communicate it among market participants.  
 Hayek’s emphasis on dispersed, tacit knowledge has been much cited in research on 
knowledge management (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) and the knowledge-based view of the 
firm (e.g., Grant, 1996; Spender, 1996; Tsoukas, 1996). Thus, while a variety of thinkers and 
philosophers have dealt with aspects of tacit knowledge (e.g., Aristotle on phronesis, Gilbert Ryle 
on “knowledge how,” Merleau-Ponty on bodily knowledge, and, of course, Michael Polanyi, who 
coined the term “tacit knowledge”), Hayek was arguably the first to raise the issue of how the best 
use of tacit knowledge is secured, asking what institutions make best use of such knowledge. On a 
highly abstract level, research on the knowledge-based view of the firm shares this aim (Grant, 
1996).  
 However, there is much more in Hayek’s work that is useful to organizational scholarship. 
Researchers critical of “rational,” design-oriented approaches in organizational theory who favor 
more constructivist approach will appreciate Hayek’s emphasis on the inherently complex nature of 
social phenomena (Hayek, 1964), his critique of scientistic design ambitions of planners and the 
underlying rationalist model of action (Hayek, 1933b, 1952a), and his subjectivism (which in many 
ways harmonizes with constructivist and sensemaking perspectives) (Hayek, 1952b) (see Tsoukas, 
1996). Organizational scholars working with evolutionary or population ecology models will 
appreciate Hayek’s general evolutionary outlook (Hayek, 1973), his emphasis on competition as 
“discovery procedure” (rather than an incentive device) (Hayek, 1968a), his sophisticated 
distinction between spontaneous and planned orders and the rules that underpin them, and his 
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argument for the rule-governed, partly tacit basis for all action in the social world (Hayek, 1973, 
1988). Organizational scholars interested in relationships between technology and organization can 
benefit from Hayek’s analysis, derived from the unique capital theory of the “Austrian” school of 
economics, of production as staged, time-consuming, and involving the deployment coordination of 
specific and complementary capital goods (Hayek, 1931, 1941; Foss, Foss, Klein, and Klein, 2007).  
In this chapter we briefly survey Hayek’s work and argue for its increasing relevance for 
organizational scholars. Hayek was a subtle writer, and a less gifted stylist than his fellow Austrian 
Joseph Schumpeter, perhaps explaining why his contributions are not better known outside of 
economics. There is a small circle of Hayekians working on the economic theory of the firm (see, 
e.g., the essays collected in Foss and Klein, 2002), and, as discussed below, Hayek’s work inspired 
aspects of Oliver Williamson’s transaction cost approach to the firm. But Hayek is usually seen 
within organizational scholarship as a narrow, technical economist. We hope to change that 
perception here. 
HAYEK’S CAREER AND THOUGHT 
Early Work on Business Cycles 
 Born in 1899 to a distinguished family of Viennese intellectuals, Hayek studied economics, 
law, and psychology at the University of Vienna and joined the private seminar of Ludwig von 
Mises along with Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Oskar Morgenstern, Felix Kaufmann, Alfred 
Schütz, and other promising young Viennese social scientists. Inspired by Mises’s 1912 book on 
monetary theory (Mises, 1912), Hayek began writing on money, capital, interest, and the business 
cycle, publishing important papers in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In 1931 he became Tooke 
Chair at the London School of Economics, where he specialized in monetary economics and helped 
promulgate the “Austrian” theory of the business cycle, becoming known as a chief rival of John 
Maynard Keynes. 
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Hayek (1931, 1933a) showed how fluctuations in economy-wide output and employment are 
related to the economy’s capital structure. Production takes time, so factors of production must be 
committed in the present for making final goods that will have value only in the future after they are 
sold. However, capital is heterogeneous: capital goods differ in durability, complementarity, 
substitutability, and specificity. Consequently, these assets cannot be easily redeployed to 
alternative uses if demands for final goods change. The central macroeconomic problem in a 
modern capital-using economy is thus one of intertemporal coordination: how can the allocation of 
resources between capital and consumer goods be aligned with consumers’ preferences between 
present and future consumption? Hayek argued that monetary injections, by lowering the rate of 
interest below what Mises (following Wicksell) called its “natural rate,” distort the economy’s 
intertemporal structure of production, leading first to a boom and then to a bust, as the investment 
projects that are started under the impact of a lowered rate of interest have to be abandoned. Hayek 
held that absent distortionary monetary policies or exogenous shocks that cause the money rate of 
interest to diverge from its natural rate, the economy is fundamentally self-regulating. Moreover, his 
theory directed attention to relative prices between capital goods as key to understanding economy-
wide fluctuations, a perspective swept aside by Keynes’s emphasis on “aggregate demand” and 
other abstractions. While Keynesian economics views the economy in engineering terms, as a giant 
machine to be manipulated (and even “fine-tuned”) by government planners, Hayek’s Austrian 
approach sees the economy as a complex, adaptive ecosystem resistant to top-down planning, as 
well as more or less temporary government intervention in the form monetary and fiscal policy or 
detailed industry or labor-market regulations. 
After Keynes’s General Theory was published in 1936, the Austrian approach largely fell out 
of favor, out of step both with the Keynesian emphasis on aggregate demand management and the 
explicit positivism of neoclassical economics (Friedman, 1953), and Hayek turned away from 
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technical economics and toward epistemology, methodology, psychology, political theory, and 
intellectual history. In 1950 Hayek joined the Committee on Social Thought at the University of 
Chicago, which housed Allan Bloom, Daniel Boorstin, T. S. Eliot, Frank Knight, Shirley Letwin, 
and Edward Shils (and later Hannah Arendt, Saul Bellow, and Michael Polanyi) and where Hayek 
stayed for ten years before returning to Europe to teach at Freiburg University. In 1974 he shared 
the Nobel Prize in economics with Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal for his work on business-
cycle theory and his analysis of the role of knowledge in the price system.  
Hayek’s Later, Trans-disciplinary Work  
 Hayek’s work on business cycles led him to revisit the fundamental issues of economics, 
notably the “coordination problem” (Foss, 1996). In the process, Hayek became increasingly 
skeptical of the explanatory value of neoclassical economics. Hayek never doubted that the 
economic system “works itself”—which he emphasized with frequent references to “spontaneous 
order”—but he thought that economists had not sufficiently explained the bottom-up, coordinating 
capacities of market competition (Hayek, 1937). How, in particular, do decision-makers obtain the 
knowledge that allows them to make decisions consistent with those of other decision-makers? 
How, in other words, is market equilibrium possible?  
 In “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (1945) Hayek argued that the central economic 
problem facing society is not, as commonly expressed in textbooks, the allocation of given 
resources among competing ends. “It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources 
known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only those individuals 
know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its 
totality” (Hayek 1945: 78). Much of the knowledge necessary for running the economic system, 
Hayek contends, exists in the form not of “scientific” or technical knowledge—the conscious 
awareness of the rules governing natural and social phenomena—but of tacit knowledge, the 
6 
 
idiosyncratic, dispersed bits of understanding of “circumstances of time and place.” This tacit 
knowledge is often not consciously known even to those who possess it and can never be 
communicated to a central authority. The market tends to use this tacit knowledge through a type of 
“discovery procedure” (Hayek 1968a), by which this information is unknowingly transmitted 
throughout the economy as an unintended consequence of individuals’ pursuing their own ends. 
 Hayek argues that market competition generates a particular kind of order—an order that is 
the product “of human action but not human design” (a phrase Hayek borrowed from Adam Smith's 
mentor Adam Ferguson). This “spontaneous order” is a system that comes about through the 
independent actions of many individuals, and produces overall benefits unintended and mostly 
unforeseen by those whose actions bring it about.  
  Hayek’s notion of spontaneous order has sometimes been equated to the neoclassical 
economics model of a “competitive equilibrium” and its associated welfare properties (i.e., an 
allocation of goods and services that is “Pareto optimal”). So-called “perfect competition” is an 
abstraction with no practical relevance for applied economics or economic policymaking. Its main 
use is to serve as a foil, in which “market failure” is defined by the presence of characteristics such 
as public goods, external benefits and costs, asymmetric information, and the like that are absent 
from the perfectly competitive equilibrium model..However, Hayek’s notion of spontaneous order 
has little to do with perfect competition or general equilibrium; his claim is simply that individual 
action often generates social outcomes that are desirable or beneficial, even if they fall short of 
some abstract theoretical ideal, and that such outcomes cannot be replicated by government 
intervention, which substitutes a planned order for the spontaneous order that results from 
individual choice.  
 Specifically, spontaneous orders refer to both states of affairs—such as the allocations 
produced by market activity at a given point in time—and institutions, such as morality, money, and 
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other evolved institutions. Hayek asserts that government action usually cannot improve on the 
resource allocation brought about, spontaneously, by the operation of market forces. This allocation 
may not be “optimal,” from the point of view of textbook models of efficient resource allocation. 
But such models aren’t relevant because they describe idealized settings that cannot be realized by 
real-world governments in a world of dispersed, tacit knowledge (Hayek, 1946). Relatedly, Hayek 
posits an ongoing cultural evolutionary process that selects some institutions rather than others, and 
suggests that government interference with this process is likely to hamper the selection of the fitter 
institutions (Hayek, 1973). 
With respect to the spontaneous order nature of market outcomes Hayek uses this to attack the 
notion of “social justice”: As market outcomes are unintended and partly unpredictable, it is a 
category mistake to apply the notion of “just”—a potential property of willed actions—to such 
outcomes (Hayek, 1976). Social justice is notoriously hard to define precisely. It can have a 
distributional aspect (i.e., the distribution of income or wealth is “just” if it conforms to some pre-
specified standard, such as perfect equality), a procedural aspect (i.e., extant regulation and laws are 
just if they respect basic liberties and rights), and an interactional perspective (i.e., practices are just 
if individuals are treated with respect by other individuals and by public authorities) (Elster, 1992; 
Jost & Kay, 2010). Hayek rejected the distributional aspect of social justice, while his emphasis on 
the rule of law and his general classical liberal outlook represents an embrace of the procedural 
aspect (and there is no reason to suspect he would have difficulties with the interactional aspect). 
Hayek did not make these distinctions explicitly, however. 
 Regarding the spontaneous order nature of institutions, Hayek embeds this view in a highly 
ambitious theory of cultural evolution. In line with the optimism of classical liberalism in general, 
Hayek asserts that those institutions that are best capable of mobilizing and making efficient use of 
dispersed knowledge will have an evolutionary advantage that will lead to their dominance over 
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time. The precise mechanisms by which this functional-evolutionary process works are, however, 
not spelled out in great detail in Hayek’s works.  
To distinguish between spontaneous order and that of a deliberate, planned system, Hayek 
(1968b: 72-76) uses the Greek terms cosmos and taxis, respectively Examples of a cosmos include 
the market system as a whole, money, the common law, and even language. A taxis, by contrast, is 
a designed or constructed organisation, like a firm or bureau; these are the “islands of conscious 
power in [the] ocean of unconscious cooperation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of 
buttermilk” (D. H. Robertson, quoted in Coase 1937: 338). 
HAYEK AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 
Perhaps of Hayek’s stature as one of the leading economists of the 20th century, his work as it 
pertains to organization has been frequently cited by (new institutional) economists who specialize 
in organization, but rarely by organization scholars working from more sociological, 
anthropological, and psychological perspectives. We begin by briefly discussing the relations 
between Hayek and his new institutionalist/organizational economics, fellow Nobel laureates, 
Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. We then broaden the view beyond new institutional 
economics and consider the relevance of Hayek’s thinking form thinking about how knowledge 
influences economic organization, specifically the boundaries and internal organization of firms. As 
we argue the Hayekian challenge to planning applies to firms as well as to centrally planned 
economies, and raises fundamental issues that are still not resolved in organization theory relating 
to the use of authority, planning, and direction in the presence of dispersed knowledge.  
Hayek and New Institutional Economics: Coase and Williamson 
Ronald Coase studied at the LSE in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He reports that Hayek’s 
concept of the “structure of production” was “the subject which dominated the discussion of 
economics at LSE” (Coase, 1988: 7). Coase’s own interest lay on a related, but distinct concept, the 
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“organizational structure of production.” While Coase’s main influences were his teacher Arnold 
Plant and a fellow student, Ronald Fowler (Coase, 1988), he was familiar with Mises’s and Hayek’s 
arguments in the socialist calculation debate, and cites Hayek’s “Trend of Economic Thinking” 
(1933b) when describing the idea of “the economic system as being coordinated by the price 
mechanism,” making society “not an organization but an organism” (Coase 1937: 387). “Indeed,” 
he adds, again citing Hayek, “it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it 
merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism” (Coase, 1937: 387). 
Coase’s argument is that reliance on the spontaneous order of the market imposes particular 
costs: searching for trading partners, discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing 
contracts, and so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur may be able to reduce “transaction costs” by 
coordinating these activities himself. Coase recognizes that there are limits to the firm—he refers in 
the 1937 paper to “diminishing returns to management” (Coase, 1937: 395)—but does not spell out 
these limits in detail. The modern economic theory of the firm conceptualizes the optimal boundary 
by comparing the transaction costs of using the market with what might be called internal 
transaction costs: problems of information flow, incentives, monitoring, and performance 
evaluation. The boundary of the firm, then, is determined by the tradeoff, at the margin, between the 
relative transaction costs of external and internal exchange. 
Coase’s “Nature of the Firm” appeared in 1937, the same year as Hayek’s “Economics and 
Knowledge,” and there are obvious connections between the two. Kirzner (1992: 162), for example, 
describes Coase’s argument in Hayekian terms: “In a free market, any advantages that may be 
derived from ‘central planning’ . . . are purchased at the price of an enhanced knowledge problem. 
We may expect firms to spontaneously expand to the point where additional advantages of ‘central’ 
planning are just offset by the incremental knowledge difficulties that stem from dispersed 
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information.” Indeed, much of the new institutional economics draws heavily from Hayekian 
themes, if not always explicitly. 
 The modern flag-bearer of the economics of the firm, Oliver Williamson has been influenced 
more directly by Hayek’s approach to knowledge, adaptation, and coordination. Williamson (1975: 
4-5) makes highly approving reference to key Hayekian themes, notably that the “problem of a 
rational economic order is trivial in the absence of bounded rationality limits on human decision 
makers,” “[m]uch of the knowledge required to make efficient economic decisions cannot be 
expressed as statistical aggregates but is highly idiosyncratic in nature,” the “economic problem is 
relatively uninteresting except where economic events are changing and sequential adaptations to 
changing market circumstances are called for,” and that the “‘marvel’ of the economic system is 
that prices serve as sufficient statistics, thereby economizing on bounded rationality.”  
Besides bounded rationality, tacit knowledge, and the informational role of prices, at least two 
other Hayekian concepts appear in Williamson’s work. One is Hayek’s (1967) emphasis on the role 
of general, abstract rules, rather than particular mandates, and his claim that social scientists should 
study patterns, rather than specific outcomes. Williamson sees his general model of contractual 
relationships or “simple contracting schema,” in which contractual hazards pose problems that 
require safeguards such as incentive alignment, specialized governance mechanisms (like vertical 
integration), or reputation through repeated dealings (Williamson, 1985:32-35), an example of a 
Hayekian general rule. “Although the particulars differ, vertical integration, nonstandard 
contracting for intermediate goods, the employment relation, corporate governance, and regulation 
are all, according to the argument developed [here], variations on a theme” (Williamson, 1985: 
348). Transaction cost economics, in Williamson’s view, is a highly general theory of economic 
organization. 
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The other important Hayekian concept in Williamson’s work is the idea of spontaneous order, 
in the context of adaptation to unanticipated change. Williamson (1991) argues that economists, 
following Adam Smith and Hayek, have tended to focus on “spontaneous governance,” the ability 
of decentralized market systems to evolve in response to changes in resource availability, technical 
knowledge, demand characteristics, and the like. The study of coordinated or intra-firm adaptation, 
Williamson argued, has received less attention, though it was a chief concern of earlier scholars of 
administrative behaviour such as Chester Barnard (1938) and Simon (1947). Barnard too argued for 
the importance of adaptation, but in a bureaucratic context. Williamson (1991: 163-64) reconcile 
Hayek and Barnard by arguing that markets have superior properties with respect to adapting to 
“autonomous” external changes (changes that do not require explicit coordination with other 
decision-makers), whereas hierarchy is superior when the relevant adaptation requires coordination 
(“bilateral adaptability”) among many decision makers.  
Williamson does not make the link between the transaction cost economics concept of asset 
specificity and Austrian capital theory, which also stresses specificity. On a high level of abstraction 
both theories share a concern with specificity in a temporal context and the resource allocation 
problems arising from specificity. In Williamson’s work,asset specificity refers to “durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of which 
investments are much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original 
transaction be prematurely terminated” (Williamson, 1985: 55). Williamson emphasizes the 
temporal aspect of production in his notion of the “fundamental transformation”: relationship-
specific investment transforms a competitive, market situation with many potential trading partners 
to a case of bilateral monopoly, ex ante competition for trading partners does not result in 
competitive behavior after contracts are signed and investments are sunk (Williamson, 1985). Like 
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Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson emphasizes the “holdup” problem that can follow 
such investments, and the role of contractual safeguards in securing the returns to those assets. 
Hayek’s (1931, 1933a, 1941) theory of capital focuses on a different type of specificity, 
namely the extent to which resources are specialized to particular places in the time structure of 
production. The capital specificity Hayek addresses is a specificity of use whereas Williamson’s is a 
specificity that is specific to a particular relation. Hayek builds on older Austrian thought here. Carl 
Menger (1871), founder of the Austrian school, famously characterized goods in terms of orders: 
goods of lowest order are those consumed directly. Tools and machines used to produce those 
consumption goods are of a higher order, and the capital goods used to produce the tools and 
machines are of an even higher order. Building on his theory that the value of all goods is 
determined by their ability to satisfy consumer wants (i.e., their marginal utility), Menger showed 
that the value of the higher-order goods is given or “imputed” by the value of the lower-order goods 
they produce. Moreover, because certain capital goods are themselves produced by other, higher-
order capital goods, it follows that capital goods are not identical—at least by the time they are 
employed in the production process. Menger’s and Hayek’s claim is not that there is no substitution 
among capital goods, but that the degree of substitution is limited. As Lachmann (1956) put it, 
capital goods are characterized by “multiple specificity.” Some substitution is possible, but only at a 
cost. This becomes problematic once the business cycle’s boom turns into a bust: specific capital 
built during the boom to produce goods no longer needed cannot be redeployed to other, more 
productive uses because of its specificity, and will be left idle. Because there is a shortage of capital 
to pool with the available labor, unemployment results. In Hayek’s as well as in Williamson’s work 
misallocation is the dark side of specificity.  
Hayek beyond New Institutional Economics: Knowledge and Organization 
 While new institutional economists who write on organizational issues pay frequent homage 
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to Hayek, his work has certainly influenced other organizational scholars. As we indicate, however, 
the implications of Hayek’s thinking have not always been fully appreciated by the scholars who 
have cited his work. 
 For example, Hayek’s work on dispersed knowledge and its implications (e.g., Hayek, 1937, 
1945) has frequently been cited by management scholars with an interest in knowledge 
management (e.g., Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Grant, 1996). However, there is a certain irony in 
this, for knowledge management is partly about the codification and centralization of dispersed 
knowledge in firms—which runs totally counter to Hayek’s thinking on dispersed knowledge. Thus, 
his key argument against planning and socialism is that it presupposes the centralization of 
knowledge that inherently cannot be centralized because of its fleeting, subjective, and tacit nature. 
This is not just a matter of the cost of searching for, identifying, transmitting, etc. such knowledge 
and/or setting up complex mechanisms for its revelation; like Polanyi (1959) Hayek seems to have 
held the view that there is knowledge that is inherently personal and cannot be communicated at any 
cost (Hayek, 1952b, 1973). Given such costs, the best knowledge management practice may often 
not be to try to seek to centralize knowledge, but to secure its optimal use through the proper choice 
of delegation of decision rights to employees (Jensen & Meckling, 1992), and via the 
establishments of rules and other institutions. 
 The implication for knowledge management is that firms should tailor-make their knowledge 
management practices to reflect the different characteristics of different organizational knowledge. 
A broader implication is that firms’ choice of organizational design need to reflect the 
characteristics of the knowledge held by the firms and its input-owners (as partly reflected in 
organizational design theory, e.g., Galbraith, 1974). Thus, dispersed knowledge constrains the 
(efficient) use of centralized allocation and coordination mechanisms, and that proper 
organizational design must take this into account. 
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 Research on the exercise of managerial authority in organizations makes strong assumptions 
about the knowledge held by managers. Thus, it is often assumed that managers are at least as (and 
often more) knowledgeable about relevant tasks as employees; that they can instruct the latter to 
carry out these tasks, and that they can somehow ascertain whether employees are sufficiently 
skilled to carry out the task adequately. However, much work in management and organization 
explicitly or implicitly challenges the traditional view of managers’ epistemic capabilities, 
deploying versions of Hayek’s knowledge-based critique of planning (e.g., Mintzberg, 1990; 
Grandori, 1997; Sharma, 1997; Brusoni, 2005). These scholars argue that if the knowledge that is 
essential in a work setting is partially unknown to the manager, dispersed across several employees, 
and perhaps evenbecause of its tacit natureit must remain unknown to the manager, the 
exercise of managerial authority is fundamentally compromised. As Grandori (2002: 257) argues 
“[dispersed] knowledge causes authority (as a centralized decision-making system) to fail in all its 
forms” (cf. also Minkler, 1993).  
 This argument may seem to acquire particularly force under the knowledge conditions that 
characterize what is often rather loosely described as the “knowledge economy” specifically an 
increased need to source outside knowledge, rely on knowledge workers and engage in distributed 
innovation processes. These conditions would if anything seem to make knowledge more dispersed, 
and indeed many authors have argued exactly this, pointing out that firms increasingly need to rely 
on a growing number of knowledge specialists, inside as well as outside their boundaries (e.g., 
Coombs and Metcalfe, 2000; Wang & von Tunzelman, 2000; Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001; 
Orlikowski, 2002; Brusoni, 2005). This tendency strains the use of managerial authority as a 
mechanism of coordination (Grandori, 1997, 2002) as knowledge dispersal transfers “real 
authority” (Aghion & Tirole, 1997) to employees, that is, those who know which decisions should 
optimally be made, when and where, in response to changing contingencies.  
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 Note that consistent (or heavy-handed?) application of Hayek’s decentralization argument 
leads to an apparent absurdity: if decentralization always and everywhere improves the utilization 
of dispersed knowledge, it would be hard to find any rooms for firms, and certainly for 
contemporary mega-sized firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1992). Yet (large) firms exist. There seems 
then to be a problem of accounting for the existence of firms, given the dispersion of knowledge.  
 Hayek recognized that planned orders, such as firms, faced a “problem which any attempt to 
bring order into complex human activities meets: the organizer must wish the individuals who are to 
cooperate to make use of knowledge that he himself does not possess” (Hayek, 1973: 49). Hayek’s 
solution to the problem was to apply his arguments that rules assist the coordination of dispersed 
knowledge, but with a modification: Whereas the rules that underlie spontaneous orders are 
abstract, applies to an unknown number of instances, and are un-designed, the rules that coordinate 
dispersed knowledge in designed orders are specific and designed. “[E]very organization must rely . 
. . on rules and not only on specific commands,” Hayek notes, and goes on to observe that the 
“reason here is the same as that which makes it necessary for a spontaneous order to rely solely on 
rules: namely that by guiding the actions of individuals by rules rather than specific commands it is 
possible to make use of knowledge which nobody possesses as a whole” (1973: 48-49).  
 Such rules are “rules for the performance of assigned tasks” and therefore “necessarily 
subsidiary to commands” (1973: 49). In other words, firms may well exist under dispersed 
knowledge conditions, but essentially because they substitute other mechanisms of coordination for 
managerial authority. The role of the top management team is to create and enforce a kind of 
“constitution” that specifies the organization’s rules of the game, while interfering as little as 
possible with the play of the game (Langlois, 1995). This is consistent with Simon’s (1991: 31) 
view that “[a]uthority in organizations is not used exclusively, or even mainly, to command specific 
actions.” Instead, he explains, it is a command that takes the form of a result to be produced, a 
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principle to be applied, or goal constraints, so that “[o]nly the end goal has been supplied by the 
command, and not the method of reaching it.” We think Hayek would have agreed. 
 However, Hayek does not fully explain how the problem of making use of dispersed knowledge 
inside firms is resolved: If knowledge dispersal obtains, how can management choose good “rules for 
the performance of assigned tasks”? How are employees assigned to tasks and how are standards 
for performance chosen when these actions are partially dependent on knowledge that management 
does not hold itself? There seems to be a fundamental design problem here. Given Hayek’s general 
evolutionary outlook, it seems warranted to suggest that this is done in the same way that societies 
discover rules, namely by trial-and-error processes, but Hayek is not forthcoming about this.  
 A HAYEKIAN AGENDA FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY? 
While Hayek said relatively little about organizations per se, he identified a key design problem that 
any social system, whatever its scale, has to address: how to make best use of dispersed knowledge. 
Although much work has been done in the broad organizational field over the last two to three decades 
on “knowledge in organizations,” Hayek’s theme still challenges extant thinking. In the following, we 
use Hayek’s thinking to identify some research gaps in organizational theory, using both Hayek’s work 
on knowledge and his ideas about resource heterogeneity. 
Improving Our Understanding of Dispersed Knowledge in Organizations  
 The research space of the “knowledge in organizations” theme is a vast one (e.g., Grandori & 
Kogut, 2002; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2003). It emerged in the 1990s with the advent of a number of 
tendencies that are often summarized under the rubric of the “knowledge economy” (Foss, 2005). 
Among these tendencies is the increasing importance of human capital inputs, immaterial assets and 
scientific knowledge in production, the increasing importance of immaterial products, the need to 
control inhouse an increasing number of technologies (even if product portfolios are shrinking) 
(Brusoni, Prencipe & Pavitt 2001), and in general to tap an increasing number of knowledge nodes, 
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not just through internal but also through an increasing number of alliances and network relations 
with other firms as well as public research institutions (Doz et al. 2004).  
 These tendencies are often seen as profoundly impacting economic organization and 
competitive advantages (Adler, 2001). Virtually all who have written on the subject agree that tasks 
and activities in the knowledge economy need to be coordinated in a manner that is quite different 
from the management of traditional manufacturing activities. However, there is considerable 
divergence in the accounts of what exactly are the changed coordination requirements in the 
knowledge economy. Thus, some argue that “traditional” coordination mechanisms such as price, 
authority, routines, standardization, etc. will diminish in relative importance, because knowledge-
intensive production requires the increased use of mechanisms such as trust, communication, 
community, democratic procedures, etc. that can better cope with the particular metering problems 
and exchange hazards that are characteristic of knowledge transactions (e.g., Ghoshal, Moran and 
Almeida-Costa, 1995).  
 These scholars typically also argue that the increasing reliance upon cross-functional 
processes, extensive delayering, and empowerment reflect an aim is to create highly specialized and 
motivated units by means of extensive delegation of discretion. Cross-functional processes 
substitute for hierarchy in the coordination of tasks. Proponents of this view will tend to see the 
boundaries of firms blurring and employment relations undergoing dramatic change as a result of 
knowledge networks increasingly cutting across the boundaries of the firm and participative 
governance being increasingly adopted. However, the mechanisms through which dispersed 
knowledge drives changes in economic organization are not always transparent, and there is a 
distinct need for identifying and theorizing such mechanisms.  
 This explanatory task requires clarifying what exactly dispersed knowledge is and how it can 
be coordinated. Hayek’s (1945) discussion of the use of knowledge in society has often been 
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invoked by economists in the context of positioning discussions of asymmetric information. 
However, as Kirzner (1997) clarifies, when Hayek and other Austrians talks about “dispersed 
knowledge” they have more in mind than the mainstream economics notion of asymmetric 
information. First, dispersed knowledge goes beyond the dyads usually (if not always) considered in 
information economics, and refer to larger social systems. Second, dispersed knowledge implies 
genuine or “sheer” ignorance, in contrast to the standard treatment of asymmetric information, in 
which the parties’ are quite knowledgeable about what they are ignorant about (e.g., while they do 
not know about the realization of some stochastic variable, they know the underlying distribution).  
 Hayek’s concept of dispersed knowledge is perhaps most closely related to the notion of 
“distributed knowledge.” Loosely, knowledge is distributed when a group of agents knows 
something no single agent (completely) knows. Thus, the notions that firms (Tsoukas, 1996) or 
whole economies (Hayek, 1945, 1973) are distributed knowledge systems mean that the set of 
agents comprising these entities somehow can be said to collectively possess knowledge that no 
single agent possesses. This does not amount to asserting the existence of mysterious supra-
individual “collective minds.” Knowledge still ultimately resides in the heads of individuals; 
however, when this knowledge is somehow combined, it means that considered as a system, the 
agents possess knowledge that they do not possess if separated. However, nobody possesses all this 
knowledge in its totality. This idea has relevance the context of the discussion across a number of 
management fields of routines and capabilities as firm-specific patterns of coordinated action that 
store and coordinate knowledge (a view originally articulated by Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
 Critics argue that this understanding, while appealing, is lacking in terms of clear micro-
foundations (e.g., Abell, Felin and Foss, 2008). Micro-foundations in social science usually imply 
“methodological individualism,” the methodological tenet that aggregate social phenomena be 
reducible in principle to the actions (and, hence, intentional states) of individuals. Hayek (1952a) 
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was a well-known advocate for methodological individualism which he took to be almost trivially 
true. Indeed, it is important not to conflate methodological individualism with ontological and 
political individualism which, in different ways, are much stronger positions. And yet, 
methodological individualism is more complex than it may appear. Strong versions may rule out 
entirely collective constructs such as rules, norms, and institutions in social science explanation, in 
stark contrast to methodological holists who argue for the explanatory independence and even 
primacy of such collective constructs. Holists think explanation can, and perhaps even should, 
proceed without reference to specific individuals or models of individuals (e.g., “representative 
agents” in economics). Instead, collective-level “social facts” should be modeled as directly causing 
social outcomes.  
 However, some versions of methodological individualism allow for collective constructs such 
as institutions, though the effect of such constructs is always mediated through the actions and 
interactions of individual agents (e.g., James Coleman’s (1990) version). Hayek was never a 
hardcore methodological individualist in the first sense above, and arguably drifted increasingly 
toward collective-level constructs—his work on cultural evolution (e.g., Hayek, 1973), for example, 
makes rules, not individuals, the unit of analysis. Hayek’s perspective on evolved rules stresses that 
these embody and coordinate dispersed knowledge, albeit, unlike routines, at the level of societies 
rather than at the level of organizations. Scholars working on the microfoundations of routines and 
capabilities may be able to find inspiration in how Hayek grappled with combining his 
methodological individualism with his evolutionary view of rules.  
Dispersed Knowledge as a Driver of Changing Organization: Opening the Black Box 
 Dispersed knowledge, as interpreted above, represent management and organizational 
challenges, because the knowledge sets of organizational designers, managers and employees may 
only be partly overlapping. The fact that the knowledge sets of organizational members are not fully 
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congruent does not, of course, compromise organized action. Another seminal social scientist, 
Frank Knight (1921) very clearly recognized this. The arguably key concept in Knight is that of 
“judgment,” that is, the human faculty that makes it possible for us to make decisions, even under 
severe ignorance. Knight explained that effective management (planning, organizational design, 
etc.) does not require full knowledge of other organizational members’ action sets and precise 
knowledge of exactly which action should be picked in response to contingencies: “What we call 
‘control’ consists mainly of selecting someone else to do the ‘controlling.’ Business judgment is 
chiefly judgment of men. We know things by knowledge of men who know them and control things 
in the same indirect way” (Knight 1921: 291). Delegation, Knight argues, rests on judgment (see 
Foss, Foss & Klein, 2007; Foss and Klein [2012] for discussions of this).  
 Managerial (and entrepreneurial) judgment inherently refers to certain knowledge domains 
and not others, ultimately because of bounded rationality and the benefits of cognitive 
specialization. The judgment exercised by a biotech CEO may be less usefully deployed in the steel 
industry. Because of this (among other reasons), steel industry firms constitute poor acquisition 
targets for biotech firms. Such reasoning provides a microfoundation to Kirzner’s (1992: 162) point 
that “We may expect firms spontaneously to expand to the point where additional advantages of 
‘central’ planning are just offset by the incremental knowledge difficulties that stem from dispersed 
information.” It is also consistent with Coase’s (1937) argument that as firm size grows, 
”dissimilarity of transactions” increases, and this is one reason why management commits an 
increasing number of mistakes as firms grow. Richardson (1972) argues that “similar” transactions 
will tend to be organized inside firms whereas “dissimilar” transactions will be organized in 
markets or hybrids (depending on the degree of complementarity between the underlying 
capabilities). Knowledge-based scholars in strategic management and organization have made very 
similar arguments (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992).  
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  Such arguments may thus be seen as (Knightian) variations on the basic Hayekian theme, 
applied to the boundaries of the firm. In other words, while firms may make efficient use of 
knowledge that is dispersed inside their corporate boundaries, as they expand increasingly 
hierarchical failure related to knowledge dispersal sets in, and help determine the boundaries of the 
firm in a Coasian manner (Coase, 1937; see also Grant [1996] and Garicano [2000]). However, there 
are two fundamental (related) problems with these arguments. First, they neglect delegation. If it is 
accepted that managers can cope with dispersed knowledge by means of delegation (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1992), why exactly should expanding the firm’s boundaries lead to increasing 
“knowledge difficulties” (Kirzner, 1992)? Second, the arguments are essentially black box in 
character. Thus, the link between knowledge dispersal and hierarchical failure is not spelled out. The 
link may indeed turn on the “similarity” and “dis-similarity” of transactionsso that more dispersed 
knowledge inside corporate hierarchies imply more dis-similar transactions, leading to more 
managerial errors and more mis-allocation, as suggested by Coase and Richardson. However, to our 
knowledge there is no explicit modeling of this idea, not to mention empirical work involving 
operationalization and measurement (but see Argyres [1996] for an attempt). In particular, there is 
no existing discriminating alignment framework that assigns transactions to governance structures 
based on their knowledge characteristics in terms of knowledge dispersal (and how this translates 
into bounds on the rationality of decision-makers).  
  These problems indicate a more general problem, namely that there are no clear micro-
foundations for knowledge-based arguments in organizational studies (Foss, 2007). For example, it 
is not clear what is the fundamental unit of analysis, how this unit is dimensionalized, and how it 
(given some efficiency criterion) maps to governance structures and mechanisms. Our understanding 
of the faculty of “judgment” is incomplete. We know little about managerial ignorance (although 
some is known about biases to managerial decision-making) and how it relates to knowledge 
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dispersal, and how this in turn affects the quality of decision making and how this translates into 
organizational costs. We know little about how to conceptualize and measure the similarity/dis-
similarity of knowledge. 
Resource Heterogeneity, Entrepreneurship, and Organizations 
One way forward is to combine Hayekian ideas with ideas from Frank Knight. The concept of 
judgment, as discussed above, is even more relevant for organizational theory and application when 
combined with Hayekian ideas about resource heterogeneity, complementarity, substitutability, 
specificity, and the like. Foss and Klein (2012) develop a theory of organization based on Knight’s 
(1921) idea that entrepreneurial judgment is non-contractible, so that entrepreneurs wishing to exercise 
judgment must create an organization to bring these judgments to bear on economic reality. “The only 
‘risk’ which leads to a profit is a unique uncertainty resulting from an exercise of ultimate 
responsibility which in its very nature cannot be insured nor capitalized nor salaried” (Knight 1921: 
311) famously put it: Exercising judgment thus requires ownership and control of resources. 
 If resources are homogeneous, there is little for the entrepreneur to exercise judgment about. 
Indeed, most of the interesting problems of economic organization collapse under the assumption that 
resources are fungible and costlessly substitutable. If we take seriously the ideas of Hayek (and 
Austrian economists more generally) about capital heterogeneity, the time-structure of production, and 
the complexity of resource combinations, we understand more clearly the role of organizational 
experimentation and adaptation. As Lachmann (1956: 16) put it: “We are living in a world of 
unexpected change; hence capital combinations … will be ever changing, will be dissolved and 
reformed. In this activity, we find the real function of the entrepreneur.” Hayekian capital theory 
provides a unique foundation for an entrepreneurial theory of economic organization. Foss and Klein 
(2012) outline this theory in detail, showing how Knightian judgment combined with Hayekian capital 
theory generates new insight on organizational emergence, boundaries, and internal structure. 
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 This may be one of the most potentially fruitful applications of Hayekian ideas, given the strong 
research, teaching, and outreach interest in entrepreneurship, particularly in business schools. Much of 
this interest is driven by a belief that entrepreneurship and innovation are key drivers of economic 
growth, and that they require a particular institutional environment—characterized by the rule of law, 
minimal government intervention, and substantial doses of personal liberty—to thrive (Klein, 2012). 
Curiously, Hayek’s direct influence on the entrepreneurship research literature is modest, though his 
work arguably underlies the “opportunity discovery” perspective that dominates the field (Shane and 
Venkataraman, 2000; Klein, 2008; Short et al., 2010). While Hayek did not write specifically about the 
entrepreneur, his idea of the market as process of mutual learning and discovery forms the basis of 
Kirzner’s (1973; 1992; 1997) theory of entrepreneurship as alertness to profit opportunities (Harper, 
2003; Foss and Klein, 2010). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we have argued that Hayekian ideas about knowledge, institutions, evolution, resources, 
and coordination have profound implications for organizational theories—and not only those based in 
economics. While organizational scholars recognize and appreciate Hayek’s approach to knowledge, 
we think the literature has not fully grasped the nature and essence of Hayek’s argument, which is not 
that knowledge problems can be solved by codifying knowledge, but that other mechanisms—rules, 
institutions, and most importantly, delegation and decentralization—can be effective means of “Coping 
with Ignorance” (Hayek, 1978).  
 Economic theories of the firm, and the New Institutional Economics more generally, have 
incorporated some of Hayek’s insights. Indeed, Hayek anticipates important issues and themes in 
transaction cost economics. But there is much broader scope for appreciating Hayekian ideas into 
modern theories of organization. In particular, a Hayekian research program in organizational studies 
would amount to examining dispersed knowledge in terms of providing precise conceptualization of 
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the construct, linking it to decision-makers’ bounded rationality, and exploring the implications for 
organizations and the management thereof of the combined effect of knowledge dispersal and bounded 
rationality.  
REFERENCES 
Abell, P. T. Felin and N.J. Foss. 2008. “Building Microfoundations for the Routines, Capabilities 
and Performance Link,” Managerial and Decision Economics 29:489-502. 
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole. 1997. “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,” Journal of Political 
Economy 105: 1-29 
Argyres, N. S. 1996. “Evidence on the Role of Firm Capabilities in Vertical Integration Decisions,” 
Strategic Management Journal 17: 129-150. 
Brusoni, Stefano. 2005. “The Limits to Specialization: Problem Solving and Coordination in 
Modular Networks,” Organization Studies 26: 1885-1907. 
Brusoni, Stefano, Andrea Prencipe, and Keith Pavitt. 2001. “Knowledge Specialization, 
Organizational Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms Know More Than 
They Make?,” Administrative Science Quarterly 46: 597-621. 
Barnard, C. I. 1938. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1937. “The Nature of the Firm,” in Nicolai J. Foss, ed. 1999. The Theory of the 
Firm: Critical Perspectives in Business and Management, Vol II. London: Routledge. 
Coase, Ronald H. 1988. “The nature of the firm: Influence,” Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 4: 33-47.  
Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Coombs, R., and S. Metcalfe. 2000. “Universities, the Science Base and the Innovation 
Performance of the UK,” CRIC Briefing Paper No. 5. The University of Manchester & 
UMIST.  
Doz, Y, J. Santos, and P. Williamson. 2001. From Global to Metanational, Harvard Business 
School Press: Boston, MA. 
Elster, J. 1992. Local Justice. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Foss, Kirsten, Nicolai J. Foss, and Peter G. Klein. 2007. “Original and Derived Judgment: an 
Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization,” Organization Studies 28: 1893-1912. 
Foss, Kirsten, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein, and Sandra K. Klein. 2007. “The Entrepreneurial 
Organization of Heterogeneous Capital,” Journal of Management Studies 44: 1165–1186. 
Foss, Nicolai J., and Peter G. Klein, eds. 2002. Entrepreneurship and the Firm: Austrian 
Perspectives on Economic Organization. Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar. 
Foss, Nicolai J., and Peter G. Klein. 2010. “Entrepreneurial Alertness and Opportunity Discovery: 
Origins, Attributes, Critique.” In Hans Landström and Franz Lohrke, eds., Historical 
Foundations of Entrepreneurship Research (Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 98-
120. 
25 
 
Foss, Nicolai J., and Peter G. Klein. 2012. Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment: A New Approach 
to the Firm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Friedman, Milton. 1953. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Galbraith, J. R. 1974. “Organization design: An information processing view,” Interfaces 3: 28-36.  
Garicano, Luis. 2000. “Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production,” Journal of 
Political Economy 108: 874-904. 
Ghoshal, S., P. Moran and L. Almeida-Costa. 1995. “The Essence of the Megacorporation: Shared 
Context, not Structural Hierarchy.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 151: 
748-759.  
Gibbons, Robert. 2005. “Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?” Journal of Economic Behavior 
& Organization 58: 200-245. 
Grandori, A. 1997. “Governance Structures, Coordination Mechanisms and Cognitive Models,” 
Journal of Management and Governance 1: 29-42. 
Grandori, A., B. Kogut. 2002. “Dialogue on organization and knowledge,” Organization Science 
13: 224–231. 
Granstrand, Ove, Pari Patel, and Keith Pavitt. 1997. “Multitechnology Corporations: Why They 
Have ‘Distributed’ Rather Than ‘Distinctive Core’ Capabilities,” California Management 
Review 39 (4): 8-25. 
Grant, Robert. 1996. “Toward a Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm,” Strategic Management 
Journal 17: 109-122. 
Harper, David. 2003. Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development. London: 
Routledge. 
Hayek, F. A. 1928. “Intertemporal Price Equilibrium and Movements in the Value of Money,” In 
Money, Capital and Fluctuations: Early Essays. University of Chicago Press, 1984: 121-137. 
Hayek, F. A. 1931. Prices and Production, London: Routledge & Sons. 
Hayek, F. A. 1933a. Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle. London: Routledge.  
Heyek, F. A. 1933b. “The Trend of Economic Thinking.” In The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, 
vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Hayek, F. A. 1937. “Economics and Knowledge,” in idem. 1948. Individualism and Economic 
Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1941. The Pure Theory of Capital, London, George Routledge & Sons. 
Hayek, F. A. 1942. “The Ricardo Effect,” idem. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1944, The Road to Serfdom London, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Hayek, F. A. 1945. “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in idem. 1948. Individualism and 
Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1946. “The Meaning of Competition,” in idem. 1948. Individualism and Economic 
Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
26 
 
 
Hayek, F.A. 1952a. The Sensory Order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F.A. 1952b. The Counter-Revolution of Sciences: Studies in the Abuse of Reason. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reprint. 
Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1972. 
Hayek, F. A. 1964. “Kinds of Rationalism,” in idem 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1967. Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1968a. “Competition as a Discovery Procedure.” Trans. Marcellus Snow. Quarterly 
Journal of Austrian Economics 5 (2002): 9-23. 
Hayek, F. A. 1968b. The Confusion of Language in Political Thought. London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs. 
Hayek, F. A. 1973. Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol.1: Rules and Order. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Heyek, F. A. 1976. Denationalisation of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of 
Concurrent Currencies. London: Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Hayek, F. A. 1978. “Coping with Ignorance,” Imprimis 7: 1-6. 
Hayek, F. A. 1984. Money, Capital and Fluctuations: Early Essays. University of Chicago Press. 
Hayek, F. A. 1988. The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Edited by W. W. Bartley III. Vol. 1 
of The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. London: Routledge, and Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989. 
Jensen, Michael C. and William H. Meckling. 1992. “Specific and General Knowledge and 
Organizational Structure,” in Lars Werin og Hans Wijkander, eds. 1992. Contract Economics. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Jost,J.T. and A.C. Kay. 2010. “Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research,” in D. T Gilbert, S.T. 
Fiske, and G. Lindzey, eds.The Handbook of Social Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Kirzner, Israel M. 1973. Competition and Entrepreneurship. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kirzner, Israel M. 1992. The Meaning of the Market Process. London: Routledge. 
Kirzner, Israel M. 1997. “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process: an 
Austrian Approach,” Journal of Economic Literature 35: 60-85. 
Klein, B., R. G.Crawford, and A. A. Alchian. 1978. ‘‘Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and 
the Competitive Contracting Process,’’ J. Law Econ 21: 297–326. 
Klein, Peter G. 2008. “Opportunity Discovery, Entrepreneurial Action, and Economic 
Organization.” Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal 2: 175-190. 
27 
 
Klein, Peter G. 2012. “Entrepreneurship and Creative Destruction.” In Brendan Miniter, ed., The 
4% Solution: How to Unleash the Economic Boom America Needs in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Crown Business): 116-26. 
Knight, Frank H. 1921. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Reprint 1965. New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley.  
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. 1992. ‘‘Knowledge of the Firm, Combinative Capabilities, and the 
Replication of Technology,’’ Organ. Sci 3: 383–397. 
Lachmann, Ludwig M. 1956. Capital and Its Structure. Kansas City : Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 
1978. 
Langlois, Richard N. 1995. “Do Firms Plan?,” Constitutional Political Economy 6: 247-261. 
Lavoie, Don. 1985. Rivalry and Central Planning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Menger, C. 1871, Principles of Economics. Auburn, Ala., Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007. 
Minkler, Alanson P. 1993. “Knowledge and Internal Organization,” Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization 21: 17-30. 
Mintzberg, Henry. 1990. “The Design School: Reconsidering the Basic Premises of Strategic 
Management,” Strategic Management Journal 11: 171-195. 
Mises, L. v. 1912. The Theory of Money and Credit. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1953 
Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Cambridge, 
MA.: The Belknap Press. 
Nonaka, I. and H. Takeuchi. 1995. The Knowledge-Creating Company. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Polanyi, M. 1959. The Study of Man, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Richardson, George B. 1972. “The Organisation of Industry,” Economic Journal 82: 883-96. 
Rothbard, M. N. 1991. “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” Review of 
Austrian Economics 5(2): 51-76 
Salerno, J. T. 1993. “Mises and Hayek Dehomogenized,” Review of Austrian Economics 6: 113-146 
Shane, Scott, and S. Venkataraman. 2000. “The Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of 
Research.” Academy of Management Review 25: 217-226. 
Sharma, Anurag. 1997. “Professional as Agent: Knowledge Asymmetry in Agency Exchange,” 
Academy of Management Review 22: 758-798. 
Short, Jeremy C., David J. Ketchen, Jr., Christopher L. Shook, and R. Duane Ireland. 2010. The 
Concept of “Opportunity” in Entrepreneurship Research: Past Accomplishments and Future 
Challenges.” Journal of Management 36: 40-65. 
Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative Behavior, New York, NY: MacMillan. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1951. “A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship,” in idem. 1982. 
Models of Bounded Rationality. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Simon, Herbert A. 1991. “Organizations and Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 25-44. 
Spender. J. C. 1996. "Organizational knowledge, learning and memory: three concepts in search of 
a theory", Journal of Organizational Change Management 9: 63 - 78 
28 
 
Tsoukas, Haridimos. 1996. “The Firm as a Distributed Knowledge System: a Constructionist 
Approach,” Strategic Management Journal 17: 11-25. 
Wang, Q. and G.N. von Tunzelman. 2000. “Complexity and the Functions of the Firm: Breadth and 
Depth”, Research Policy 29: 805-818.  
Williamson, O.E. 1975, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implication: A Study in 
the Economics of Internal Organization, New York, Free Press, 286 p. 
Williamson, O.E. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational 
Contracting, New York, NY: The Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1991). “Economic institutions: spontaneous and intentional governance,” 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 7: 159-187.  
 
 
 
 
SMG – Working Papers 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
 
2003 
2003-1: Nicolai J. Foss, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova, and Torben Pedersen: 
Governing Knowledge Processes: Theoretical Foundations and Research 
Opportunities. 
2003-2: Yves Doz, Nicolai J. Foss, Stefanie Lenway, Marjorie Lyles, Silvia Massini, 
Thomas P. Murtha and Torben Pedersen: Future Frontiers in International 
Management Research: Innovation, Knowledge Creation, and Change in 
Multinational Companies. 
2003-3: Snejina Michailova and Kate Hutchings: The Impact of In-Groups and Out-
Groups on Knowledge Sharing in Russia and China CKG Working Paper. 
2003-4: Nicolai J. Foss and Torben Pedersen: The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: The 
Roles of Knowledge Sources and Organizational Instruments in MNC Knowledge 
Management CKG Working Paper. 
2003-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss and Xosé H. Vázquez-Vicente: “Tying the Manager’s 
Hands”: How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic 
Managerial Intervention Less Likely CKG Working Paper. 
2003-6: Marjorie Lyles, Torben Pedersen and Bent Petersen: Knowledge Gaps: The Case 
of Knowledge about Foreign Entry. 
2003-7: Kirsten Foss and Nicolai J. Foss: The Limits to Designed Orders: Authority under 
“Distributed Knowledge” CKG Working Paper. 
2003-8: Jens Gammelgaard and Torben Pedersen: Internal versus External Knowledge 
Sourcing of Subsidiaries - An Organizational Trade-Off. 
2003-9: Kate Hutchings and Snejina Michailova: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing in 
Russian and Chinese Subsidiaries: The Importance of Groups and Personal 
Networks Accepted for publication in Journal of Knowledge Management. 
2003-10: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen and Markus Verzin: The Impact of Knowledge 
Management on MNC Subsidiary Performance: the Role of Absorptive Capacity 
CKG Working Paper. 
2003-11: Tomas Hellström and Kenneth Husted: Mapping Knowledge and Intellectual 
Capital in Academic Environments: A Focus Group Study Accepted for 
publication in Journal of Intellectual Capital  CKG Working Paper.  
2003-12: Nicolai J Foss: Cognition and Motivation in the Theory of the Firm: Interaction or 
“Never the Twain Shall Meet”? Accepted for publication in Journal des Economistes 
et des Etudes Humaines CKG Working Paper.  
2003-13: Dana Minbaeva and Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Transfer and Expatriation 
Practices in MNCs: The Role of Disseminative Capacity.  
2003-14: Christian Vintergaard and Kenneth Husted: Enhancing Selective Capacity 
Through Venture Bases.  
2004 
2004-1: Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge and Organization in the Theory of the Multinational 
Corporation: Some Foundational Issues 
2004-2: Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM Practices and MNC Knowledge Transfer  
2004-3: Bo Bernhard Nielsen and Snejina Michailova: Toward a Phase-Model of Global 
Knowledge Management Systems in Multinational Corporations 
2004-4: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J Foss: The Next Step in the Evolution of the RBV: 
Integration with Transaction Cost Economics 
2004-5: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Methodological Individualism and the 
Organizational Capabilities Approach 
2004-6: Jens Gammelgaard, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova: Knowledge-sharing 
Behavior and Post-acquisition Integration Failure 
2004-7: Jens Gammelgaard: Multinational Exploration of Acquired R&D Activities 
2004-8: Christoph Dörrenbächer & Jens Gammelgaard: Subsidiary Upgrading? Strategic 
Inertia in the Development of German-owned Subsidiaries in Hungary 
2004-9: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Resources and Transaction Costs: How the 
Economics of Property Rights Furthers the Resource-based View 
2004-10: Jens Gammelgaard & Thomas Ritter: The Knowledge Retrieval Matrix: 
Codification and Personification as Separate Strategies 
2004-11: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of 
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade? 
2004-12: Akshey Gupta & Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Sharing in Knowledge-Intensive 
Firms: Opportunities and Limitations of Knowledge Codification 
2004-13: Snejina Michailova & Kate Hutchings: Knowledge Sharing and National Culture: 
A Comparison Between China and Russia 
 
2005 
2005-1: Keld Laursen & Ammon Salter: My Precious - The Role of Appropriability 
Strategies in Shaping Innovative Performance 
2005-2: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A 
Stocktaking and Assessment 
2005-3: Lars Bo Jeppesen & Lars Frederiksen: Why Firm-Established User Communities 
Work for Innovation: The Personal Attributes of Innovative Users in the Case of 
Computer-Controlled Music  
2005-4: Dana B. Minbaeva: Negative Impact of HRM Complementarity on Knowledge 
Transfer in MNCs 
2005-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Sandra K. Klein: Austrian Capital 
Theory and the Link Between Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
2005-1: Nicolai J. Foss: The Knowledge Governance Approach 
2005-2: Torben J. Andersen: Capital Structure, Environmental Dynamism, Innovation 
Strategy, and Strategic Risk Management 
2005-3: Torben J. Andersen: A Strategic Risk Management Framework for Multinational 
Enterprise 
2005-4: Peter Holdt Christensen: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing: A Conceptual 
Framework 
2005-5 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hands Off! How Organizational Design Can Make 
Delegation Credible 
2005-6 Marjorie A. Lyles, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: Closing the Knowledge Gap 
in Foreign Markets - A Learning Perspective 
2005-7 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: How do we 
Capture “Global Specialization” when Measuring Firms’ Degree of 
internationalization? 
2005-8 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Simon on Problem-Solving: Implications for New 
Organizational Forms 
2005-9 Birgitte Grøgaard, Carmine Gioia & Gabriel R.G. Benito: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Role of Industry Factors in the Internationalization Patterns of 
Firms 
2005-10 Torben J. Andersen: The Performance and Risk Management Implications of 
Multinationality: An Industry Perspective 
2005-11 Nicolai J. Foss: The Scientific Progress in Strategic Management: The case of the 
Resource-based view 
2005-12 Koen H. Heimeriks: Alliance Capability as a Mediator Between Experience and 
Alliance Performance: An Empirical Investigation Into the Alliance Capability 
Development Process 
2005-13 Koen H. Heimeriks, Geert Duysters & Wim Vanhaverbeke: Developing Alliance 
Capabilities: An Empirical Study 
2005-14 JC Spender: Management, Rational or Creative? A Knowledge-Based Discussion 
 
2006 
2006-1: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Emergence of the Modern Theory of the Firm 
2006-2: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Individuals and Organizations: Thoughts on a 
Micro-Foundations Project for Strategic Management and Organizational 
Analysis 
2006-3: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen & Markus Venzin: Does Knowledge Sharing 
Pay? An MNC Subsidiary Perspective on Knowledge Outflows 
2006-4: Torben Pedersen: Determining Factors of Subsidiary Development 
 
2006-5 Ibuki Ishikawa: The Source of Competitive Advantage and Entrepreneurial 
Judgment in the RBV: Insights from the Austrian School Perspective 
2006-6 Nicolai J. Foss & Ibuki Ishikawa: Towards a Dynamic Resource-Based View: 
Insights from Austrian Capital and Entrepreneurship Theory 
2006-7 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss:  Entrepreneurship, Transaction Costs, and 
Resource Attributes  
2006-8 Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Original and Derived Judgement: 
An Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization 
2006-9 Mia Reinholt: No More Polarization, Please! Towards a More Nuanced 
Perspective on Motivation in Organizations 
2006-10 Angelika Lindstrand, Sara Melen & Emilia Rovira: Turning social capital into 
business? A study of Swedish biotech firms’ international expansion 
2006-11 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Charles Dhanaraj: Evolution of 
Subsidiary Competences: Extending the Diamond Network Model 
2006-12 John Holt, William R. Purcell, Sidney J. Gray & Torben Pedersen: Decision Factors 
Influencing MNEs Regional Headquarters Location Selection Strategies 
2006-13 Peter Maskell, Torben Pedersen, Bent Petersen & Jens Dick-Nielsen: Learning 
Paths to Offshore Outsourcing - From Cost Reduction to Knowledge Seeking 
2006-14 Christian Geisler Asmussen: Local, Regional or Global? Quantifying MNC 
Geographic Scope 
2006-15 Christian Bjørnskov & Nicolai J. Foss: Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial 
Activity: Some Cross-Country Evidence 
2006-16 Nicolai J. Foss & Giampaolo Garzarelli: Institutions as Knowledge Capital: 
Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism 
2006-17 Koen H. Heimriks & Jeffrey J. Reuer: How to Build Alliance Capabilities 
2006-18 Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein, Yasemin Y. Kor & Joseph T. Mahoney: 
Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource – Based View: Towards a New 
Synthesis 
2006-19 Steven Globerman & Bo B. Nielsen: Equity Versus Non-Equity International 
Strategic Alliances: The Role of Host Country Governance 
 
2007 
2007-1 Peter Abell, Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Building Micro-Foundations for the 
Routines, Capabilities, and Performance Links  
2007-2 Michael W. Hansen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: MNC Strategies and 
Linkage Effects in Developing Countries 
2007-3 Niron Hashai, Christian G. Asmussen, Gabriel R.G. Benito & Bent Petersen: 
Predicting the Diversity of Foreign Entry Modes 
2007-4 Peter D. Ørberg Jensen & Torben Pedersen: Whether and What to Offshore? 
2007-5 Ram Mudambi & Torben Pedersen: Agency Theory and Resource Dependency 
Theory: Complementary Explanations for Subsidiary Power in Multinational 
Corporations 
2007-6 Nicolai J. Foss: Strategic Belief Management 
2007-7 Nicolai J. Foss: Theory of Science Perspectives on Strategic Management Research: 
Debates and a Novel View 
2007-8 Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM Practices and Knowledge Transfer in MNCs 
2007-9 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge Governance in a Dynamic Global Context: The Center 
for Strategic Management and Globalization at the Copenhagen Business School 
2007-10 Paola Gritti & Nicolai J. Foss: Customer Satisfaction and Competencies: An 
Econometric Study of an Italian Bank 
2007-11 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Organizational Governance 
2007-12 Torben Juul Andersen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: The Effective Ambidextrous 
Organization: A Model of Integrative Strategy Making Processes. 
 
2008 
2008-1 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss:  Managerial Authority When Knowledge is 
Distributed: A Knowledge Governance Perspective 
2008-2 Nicolai J. Foss: Human Capital and Transaction Cost Economics. 
2008-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and Heterogeneous Capital. 
2008-4 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Need for an Entrepreneurial Theory of the 
Firm. 
2008-5 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship: From Opportunity Discovery 
to Judgment. 
2008-6 Mie Harder: How do Rewards and Management Styles Influence the Motivation 
to Share Knowledge? 
2008-7 Bent Petersen, Lawrence S. Welch & Gabriel R.G. Benito: Managing the 
Internalisation Process – A Theoretical Perspective.  
2008-8 Torben Juul Andersen: Multinational Performance and Risk Management Effects: 
Capital Structure Contingencies. 
2008-9 Bo Bernard Nielsen: Strategic Fit and the Role of Contractual and Procedural 
Governance in Alliances: A Dynamic Perspective. 
2008-10 Line Gry Knudsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Collaborative Capability in R&D 
Alliances: Exploring the Link between Organizational and Individual level 
Factors. 
2008-11 Torben Juul Andersen & Mahesh P. Joshi: Strategic Orientations of 
Internationalizing Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Firms Operating in 
Technology Intensive and Common Goods Industries. 
2008-12 Dana Minbaeva: HRM Practices Affecting Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation of 
Knowledge Receivers and their Effect on Intra-MNC Knowledge Transfer. 
2008-13 Steen E. Navrbjerg & Dana Minbaeva: HRM and IR in Multinational 
Corporations: Uneasy Bedfellows? 
2008-14 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hayekian Knowledge Problems in Organizational 
Theory. 
2008-15 Torben Juul Andersen: Multinational Performance Relationships and Industry 
Context. 
2008-16 Larissa Rabbiosi: The Impact of Subsidiary Autonomy on MNE Knowledge 
Transfer: Resolving the Debate. 
2008-17 Line Gry Knudsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Organizational and Individual Level 
Antecedents of Procedural Governance in Knowledge Sharing Alliances. 
2008-18 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Understanding Opportunity Discovery and 
Sustainable Advantage: The Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights. 
2008-19 
 
2008-20 
Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Social Reality, The Boundaries of Self-fulfilling 
Prophecy, and Economics. 
Yves Dos, Nicolai J. Foss & José Santos: A Knowledge System Approach to the 
Multinational Company: Conceptual Grounding and Implications for Research 
2008-21 Sabina Nielsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Why do Firms Employ foreigners on Their 
Top Management Teams? A Multi-Level Exploration of Individual and Firm 
Level Antecedents 
2008-22 Nicolai J. Foss: Review of Anders Christian Hansen’s “Uden for hovedstrømmen 
– Alternative strømninger i økonomisk teori” 
2008-23 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge, Economic Organization, and Property Rights 
2008-24 Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: Is There a Trend Towards 
Global Value Chain Specialization? – An Examination of Cross Border Sales of US 
Foreign Affiliates 
2008-25 Vikas Kumar, Torben Pedersen & Alessandro Zattoni: The performance of 
business group firms during institutional transition: A longtitudinal study of 
Indian firms 
2008-26 Sabina Nielsen & Bo B. Nielsen: The effects of TMT and Board Nationality 
Diversity and Compensation on Firm Performance 
2008-27 Bo B. Nielsen & Sabina Nielsen: International Diversification Strategy and Firm 
Performance: A Multi-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Effects 
 
2009 
2009-1 Nicolai J. Foss: Alternative Research Strategies in the Knowledge Movement: From 
Macro Bias to Micro-Foundations and Multi-Level Explanation 
2009-2 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurial Alertness and Opportunity 
Discovery: Origins, Attributes, Critique 
2009-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Dana B. Minbaeva: Governing Knowledge: The Strategic Human 
Resource Management Dimension 
2009-4 Nils Stieglitz & Nicolai J. Foss: Opportunities and New Business Models: 
Transaction Cost and Property Rights Perspectives on Entrepreneurships 
2009-5 Torben Pedersen: Vestas Wind Systems A/S: Exploiting Global R&D Synergies 
2009-6 
 
Rajshree Agarwal, Jay B. Barney, Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Heterogeneous 
Resources and the Financial Crisis: Implications of Strategic Management Theory 
2009-7 Jasper J. Hotho: A Measure of Comparative Institutional Distance 
2009-8 Bo B. Nielsen & Sabina Nielsen: The Impact of Top Management Team Nationality 
Diversity and International Experience on Foreign Entry Mode   
2009-9 Teppo Felin & Nicolai Juul Foss: Experience and Repetition as Antecedents of 
Organizational Routines and Capabilities: A Critique of Behaviorist and Empiricist 
Approaches 
2009-10 Henk W. Volberda, Nicolai J. Foss & Marjorie E. Lyles: Absorbing the Concept of 
Absorptive Capacity: How To Realize Its Potential in the Organization Field 
2009-11 
 
2009-12   
Jan Stentoft Arlbjørn, Brian Vejrum Wæhrens, John Johansen & Torben Pedersen: 
Produktion i Danmark eller offshoring/outsourcing: Ledelsesmæssige 
udfordringer 
 
 
Torben Pedersen: The 30 Largest Firms in Denmark 
  
2010 
 
2010-1 Dana B. Minbaeva, Kristiina Mäkelä & Larissa Rabbiosi: Explaining Intra-
organizational Knowledge Transfer at the Individual Level 
 
2010-2     Dana B.Minbaeva & Torben Pedersen: Governing Individual Knowledge Sharing 
Behavior 
2010-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Alertness, Judgment, and the Antecedents of 
Entrepreneurship  
2010-4 Nicolai J.Foss & Joseph T.Mahoney: Exploring Knowledge Governance 
2010-5 Jasper J. Hotho, Florian Becker-Ritterspach & Ayse Saka-Helmhout: Enriching 
Absorptive Capacity Through Social Interaction 
 
2010-6 Nicolai J. Foss & Bo B. Nielsen: Researching Collaborative Advantage: Some 
Conceptual and Multi-level Issues 
 
2010-7 Nicolai J. Foss & Nils Stieglitz: Modern Resource-Based Theory(ies) 
2010-8 Christian Bjørnskov & Nicolai J. Foss: Do Economic Freedom and 
Entrepreneurship Impact Total Factor Productivity?  
 
2010-9 Gabriel R.G. Benito, Bent Petersen & Lawrence S. Welch: Mode Combinations and 
International Operations: Theoretical Issues and an Empirical Investigation 
 
2011 
 
2011-1 Peter D. Ørberg Jensen & Bent Petersen: Human Asset Internalization and Global 
Sourcing of Services – A Strategic Management Analysis on Activity‐level 
 
2011-2 Mie Harder: Management Innovation Capabilities:  A Typology and Propositions 
for Management Innovation Research 
 
2011-3 Mie Harder: Internal Antecedents of Management Innovation: The effect of 
diagnostic capability and implementation capability 
 
2011-4 Mie Harder: Explaining Management Innovation Pervasiveness: The Role of 
Internal Antecedents 
2011-5 Mie Harder: Internal Determinants of Product Innovation and Management 
Innovation: The Effect of Diagnostic Capability and Implementation Capability 
2011-6 Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Per L. Bylund: Entrepreneurship and the 
Economics of the Firm 
2011-7  Nicolai J. Foss & Jacob Lyngsie: The Emerging Strategic Entrepreneurship Field: 
Origins, Key Tenets and Research Gaps 
2011-8 
 
Nicolai J. Foss: Entrepreneurship in the Context of the Resource-based View of the 
Firm 
 
2011-9 Bent Petersen, Gabriel R.G. Benito, Olesya Dovgan & Lawrence Welch: Offshore 
outsourcing: A dynamic, operation mode perspective 
2011-10 Bent Petersen, Gabriel R. G. Benito & Lawrence Welch: Dynamics of Foreign 
Operation Modes and their Combinations: Insights for International Strategic 
Management 
2011-11 Nicolai J. Foss: Teams, Team Motivation, and the Theory of the Firm 
2011-12 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge Governance: Meaning, Nature, Origins, and Implications 
2011-13 Nicolai J. Foss, Kirsten Foss & Phillip C. Nell: MNC Organizational Form and 
Subsidiary Motivation Problems: Controlling Intervention Hazards in the Network MNC 
2011-14 Kåre Moberg: Evaluating Content Dimensions in Entrepreneurship Education 
 
 
2012 
 
2012-1 Nicolai J. Foss, Nicholas Argyres, Teppo Felin & Todd Zenger: The Organizational 
Economics of Organizational Capability and Heterogeneity: A Research Agenda 
2012-2 
 
Torben J. Andersen, Carina Antonia Hallin & Sigbjørn Tveterås: A Prediction 
Contest: The Sensing of Frontline Employees Against Executive Expectations 
2012-3 
 
Peter G. Klein, Jay B. Barney & Nicolai J. Foss: Strategic Entrepreneurship 
2012-4 
 
Kåre Moberg: The Impact of Entrepreneurship Education and Project-based 
Education on Students’ Personal Development and Entrepreneurial Intentions at 
the Lower Levels of the Educational System: Too Much of Two Good Things? 
2012-5 
 
Keld Laursen & Nicolai J. Foss: Human Resource Management Practices and 
Innovation 
2012-6 
 
 
2013-1 
 
Kåre Moberg: An Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy Scale with a Neutral Wording 
 
 
2013 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss, Diego Stea: The Principal’s Theory of Mind: The Role of 
Mentalizing for Reward Design and Management in Principal-Agent Relations  
2013-2 
 
2013-3 
 
 
Dana Minbaeva, Chansoo Park & Ilan Vertinsky: The Influence of Foreign 
Partners’ Disseminative Capacities on Knowledge Transfers to International Joint 
Ventures 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Hayek and Organizational Studies 
 
